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THE *Hum. 13.*  
UNREASONABLENESS  
Of Attempting the  
Conversion of a Papist,  
UPON THE  
Bishop of *Bangor*'s Principles,  
Farther Asserted.

In Answer to *Silvius*'s Defence of  
a Dialogue between a Papist  
and a Protestant.

With a Reply to some particular  
Objections.

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L O N D O N:

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
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T H E  
UNREASONABLENESS  
Of Attempting the Conversion  
of a PAPIST, &c.



AS I look upon every Branch of the Controversy now on foot with the Bishop of *Bangor* and his Friends, to be worthy the Consideration of a Christian, I will not permit any part which I have born in it to suffer, for want of that Justice which I am capable of doing it. And it is upon this account that I think my self obliged to spend a few Observations upon *Silvius's* late *Defence*, &c. It concerns a *Dialogue* between a *Papist* and a *Protestant*, which was given us at first in his *Letter* to the Reverend Dr. *Sherlock*, and of which I took some notice in the *Preface* to my *Appeal*. To this he has added several *Remarks* and *Observations* upon my *Manner of Writing* and *Reasoning*. These are the two Parts of the Book, in which I do not purpose to examine every Paragraph, because I think there is no need of it. I shall only select

select the most material Passages under each Head.

At his very first setting out, he shews us how much he has profited by a great Example ; for he begins with *complaining* ; and his Complaint is, that I have used him *uncivilly* ; a Charge which I think I have not deserved from him. But not to trouble the Reader with such personal Matters as these, I shall go directly to his Reasoning, and if we can agree in the main Controversy, the Differences in point of *Ceremony* will, 'tis to be hoped, in due time be adjusted.

The Question is this, and this only, whether supposing the Truth of what the Bishop of *Bangor* has taught concerning the *Availableness* of *Sincerity*, there is any Reason to attempt the Conversion of a *sincere Papist*. Applying my self to *Silvius* upon this Point, I remarked in the first place, that in his way of stating the Case, he had made it to relate to the *Possibility* of *Converting a Papist* ; and this gave me occasion to say (which I perceive is matter of great Offence to him) that it was very seldom his good Fortune to hit upon the true Point. *Silvius*, tho' (as it should seem) he is not apt to (b) reckon his MISTAKES in the number of his WOES, is yet so loath to be mistaken here, that he insists upon it that this is one part of the Question. But why so ? Did the Dean of *Chichester*, from whom the Objection was taken, state it in this manner ? Did, he ever say, that the Conversion of a *Papist* was impossible upon his Lordship's Principles ? Why no ; it is granted

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(a) p. 4. (b) p. 32. (c) p. 4.

that (d) expressly he did not. But I had reason (says *Silvius*) to suppose that he might be aware of this Difficulty, i. e. (if he had a mind to speak to the purpose) I had reason to suppose that this Objection, tho' not expressed, was virtually intended by the Dean. And now, pray hear the Reason. Did not Dr. Sherlock represent the Papist as fully perswaded, that on the Bishop's Principle he could reap no Advantages from a Change of his Religion? And must not such a Perswasion, while he continued in it, render it morally impossible to convert him? Can it be imagined that any Man would give himself the trouble of attending to a long train of Arguments, from which (however they might happen to work upon him) he expected not the least Benefit? The Case you see is thus far altered already, that from Impossible (Absolutely) we are come to Impossible Morally, which are different things. But I shall not insist upon this, but will suppose the meaning of the Question to be, whether the Dean intended to object, that upon the Bishop's Principle, the Conversion of a Papist is morally impossible. *Silvius* would fain have us believe that he did; and how does he prove it? Why not (as one would have expected) by producing any words of the Dean, that have a tendency to shew it, but by laying down certain Conclusions of his own, by which, as he thinks, it appears that the Dean ought to have objected, that the Conversion of a Papist is morally impossible upon the Bishop's Principles. This is manifestly of no weight, supposing that the Inference were just; but if there be any Truth in what the Bi-

shop and *Silvius* have both of them said, it is certainly wrong. For thus it stands: Because a sincere *Papist* is fully perswaded that he can reap no Advantage from the Change of his Religion, therefore he will not attend to such Arguments as are offered for his Conviction; and therefore it is *morally impossible* to convert him. But doth not the Bishop of *Bangor* say, with some Indignation against those who (as he fancied) had supposed the contrary, that his Doctrine *doth not make it excusable in Men to guard against all future Light?* And hath not *Silvius* himself replied to his *Papist*, whom he had represented as guarding against all future Light; *However sincere you may have been till now, you must quit your Pretensions to Sincerity for the future, if you slight my Arguments, and reject my Endeavours to inform and convince you?* If then it be inconsistent with Sincerity, that a Man refuses to listen to such Arguments as are offered for his Conviction; how is it consistent to say, that the Conversion of a *Papist* (supposed to be Sincere) is *morally impossible*, because he will not attend to such Arguments as are offered for his Conviction? *Silvius* pretends indeed that *as to a Sense of any Obligation to submit to so much Trouble, that is likewise out of the Supposition.* But by whose means, I pray? Why, by his own; who has himself arbitrarily put it out of the Supposition, purely to make room for putting something into the Question, which the Question has nothing to do with. But I must needs demand it back again. The Supposition is about a Sincere *Papist*: If then (as you say) Sincerity supposes a Sense of this Obligation you speak of, it is plain that a Sense of this Obligation is not out of the Supposition, but in the Supposition. Nor does it at all alter the Case, that the *Papist* is supposed *fully*

by persuaded that he can reap no Advantage from the Change of his Religion. For that a Papist is in as good a Condition whilst a Papist, as he would be in if he were a Protestant, the Question supposes to be owing to his Sincerity ; and therefore tho' he can reap no Advantage by his Conversion, he will still be oblig'd to attend to such Arguments as shall be offer'd in order to his Conversion. That a Person indeed should be obliged to the use of Means, without any Prospect of bettering his Condition, supposing that he succeeds in the use of those Means, is a thing not easy to be accounted for, and I shall leave it to the Consideration of the Bishop and his Friends, who are the only Persons concerned in resolving the Difficulty. In particular I must recommend it to *Silvius*, who in his Dialogue has raised the Objection himself, and then very gallantly turn'd his back upon it. But I am sorry to find that the Case is so bad with him, as that he should be forced, in order to shew that he had hit upon one true Point, to have recourse to such Reasoning as (if it proves any thing) proves that he has been widely mistaken in another of much greater Consequence. He has reason, I confess, to wish either that my Eyes were pulled out of my Head, or that he had a better Memory.

I have mentioned this, not for any weight that there is in it, as to the main Point between us, but to shew the Reader what Pains some Men will be at, lest they should have no fault to find with what an Adversary *doth* say, to lay to his Charge that which he *doth not*. I now proceed to the true State of the Question, which, as (I said before) is this, whether it be reasonable to attempt the Conversion of a Sincere Papist upon his Lordship's Principle. The Reason assigned why  
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it is *not* reasonable, was, that if you *should* convert a *Papist* (a very plain Argument by the way, that the Dean supposed it *possible* to convert a *Papist*) from his Errors, you could not according to his Lordship's Principle make his *Condition* before God *the better* ; but if you *should not* convert him you might possibly make it *worse*. Upon this *Silvius* joined Issue, and undertook to prove, that the *Converting* a *Papist* was not a *fruitless* piece of *Work*, but that it *might* be done to very good *Purpose*, and *actually* would be so, wherever it *should* succeed. And thus he began :

Truth is a real Good ; for Truth will be one of the principal Enjoyments of the Blessed hereafter : And having upon this latter Clause of the Assertion charged *Silvius* with saying he knew not what ; forasmuch as the Scriptures have told us that the Happiness of Heaven consists in the Participation of the Happiness of God, which is a great deal more than SIMPLY the Enjoyment of TRUTH ; he in return is pleased to charge me with Impertinence, in not observing that he (e) did not make the Happiness of Heaven to consist WHOLLY in the Enjoyment of TRUTH, nor say that it was THE PRINCIPAL Enjoyment of Heaven, but only ONE of its PRINCIPAL Enjoyments. I shall content my self barely to lay before the Reader the true Scope and Tendency of my Answer (which I verily thought there was no occasion for me largely to insist upon) and then leave him, and (if he pleases) *Silvius* once more to consider of the Impertinency of it. Now the Argument is this : That since we are to take our Notions of the Happiness of Heaven from the Scripture, wherein only the Knowledge of it is

revealed ; and since the *Scripture* has in general only inform'd us, that the *Happiness* of *Heaven* consists in the *Participation* of the *Divine Happiness*, 'tis saying, we know not what, when we take upon our selves to define particularly in what this *Happiness* does more or less principally consist. *Silvius* very well observes that the *Participation* of the *Divine Happiness* comprehends other *Enjoyments*, besides that of *TRUTH*. Does he know what those other *Enjoyments* are ? If he does not, how does he know which of them is greater, and which less ? Or how is it possible that we should understand our selves, when we presume to state the Difference in Point of *Excellency* between those things which *Eye* hath not seen, nor *Ear* heard, nor hath it entered into the *Heart* of *Man* to conceive ? The Argument you see concludes not thus ; because the *Participation* of *Divine Happiness* comprehends other *Enjoyments*, besides that of *Truth*, therefore *Truth* cannot be one of the principal *Enjoyments* of the *Blessed* : which is the Inference which *Silvius* has fixed upon me, because (I suppose) it is a ridiculous one. But it concludes thus : Because the *Participation* of *Divine Happiness* comprehends other *Enjoyments* besides that of *Truth*, and you know not the *Particulars* of that *Happiness* ; therefore you cannot be sure which are the *Principal*, and consequently, to say that *Truth* is one of the *Principal*, is to say you know not what. If *Silvius* does not like this Answer, I must freely confess that I have no better for him. He, it seems expected that I should have proved, that the *Enjoyment* of *Truth* is not one of the *Principal* *Enjoyments* of the *Blessed* hereafter, i. e. he expected that I too should have said, I knew not what. I do assure *Silvius*, if this will satisfy him, that for ought I know, *Truth* may be one of the *Principal* *Enjoyments* of

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the Blessed; but then he must take this along with him, that for ought *he* knows it *may be* one of the *least*. And if he will be contented to sit down and joyn with me in confessing each of us our own *Ignorance* in this Particular, well and good. But, if not, I shall very contentedly leave him to be wise by himself, thinking it much more decent in me to rest satisfied with that general and imperfect Knowledge which the Scripture affordeth, than to *intrude into those things which I have not seen*. Archbishop Tillotson, 'tis true, has mentioned the *Perfection* of our Knowledge as one of the *chief Ingredients* of the *Happiness of Heaven*; and *Silvius* hopes that I will not charge him with saying he knew not what. No; there is a Decency due to the Name of that great Man, which *Silvius* must shew us who he is, before he can make any just Pretensions to. But this I will venture to say, that he who expects the same Exactness in a *Practical Discourse* from the Pulpit, that he looks for in a *Theological Dispute*, seems to have no good Notion of the one or the other; and that had the Archbishop been pressed with this Question, whether among the *Numberless* and *Ineffable Joys* of that Place, he could certainly say which are the *Principal*; I make no doubt but he would have acknowledged that it was too hard for him. Besides, he only says that the *Perfection* of our Knowledge is one of the *chief Ingredients* of this Happiness, *so far as the Scripture hath thought fit to reveal it to us*. He hath not defined, nor ought *Silvius* to presume to define, whether those which the Scripture hath revealed, be or be not the *Principal*.

But to proceed; To shew that *Truth* was a real Good, *Silvius* observed, that *even in this Life it brought Pleasure and Content to the Mind of Man*. This was nothing to the Purpose; the Question relating

relating not to the Difference between a *Papist* and a *Protestant* in *this* Life, but in the Life to come. However, in going along, I just took notice that *Truth* brought as much Pleasure to the Mind, as *Falshood*, under the *Appearance* of *Truth*, and *no more*. Upon this *Silvius* hath treated his Readers with about five Pages of *Speculation*, the bottom of which I must ingenuously confess, I am not *Philosopher* enough to reach. The Point is this ; What difference is there, as to the *Pleasure* which the Mind receives, whether a Man holds the *Truth*, or whether he holds a *Falshood*, which he most firmly *believes* to be *Truth* ? And surely there can be no need to go to *Lock*, or *Malbranche*, or *Silvius*, to find an Answer ; for the Difference at the very first sight appears to be nothing at all. I say it again and *Silvius* may quarrel with the Expression as long as he is disposed to do it) that *the Mind receives Pleasure, not from the Real abstracted Nature of things, but from the Relation which they bear to it self. i. e. that the Pleasure arises not from what things really are in themselves, but from what they appear to us to be, or from the manner in which we are moved or affected by them.* In *Corporeal Perception* the thing is plain and undeniable. Every one knows that the *Disposition* of our *Bodily Organs* to receive such or such a *Modification* from the *Action* or *Impression* of *External Objects*, is the Foundation of this *Preception*. Thus *Honey*, by affecting the *Organs* of *Taste* in a peculiar manner, raises that *Sensation* which we call *Sweetness* ; and *Gall* by affecting them in a different manner, raises that which we call *Bitterness* ; and these Effects will always be the same, so long as the *Organs* are *rightly disposed*. But if the *Organs* should be so much *indisposed*, as to be *alike Affected*, or *Modified* upon the *Impression* of both

these *Objects*, would it not be the same thing (as to the Matter of *Pleasure*) whether you should eat *Honey*, or whether you should eat *Gall*? Or, if it were so, that the *Organs* should receive the same *Modification* from the Application of *Honey*, that in a well disposed state they would receive from the Application of *Gall*, and *vice versa*, would not the latter be *pleasant*, and the former *disagreeable*? Apply this now to the Case before us. Truth is a certain *Agreement* or *Proportion* between one thing and another; and the *Pleasure* of Truth arises from the *Perception* of this *Agreement*. When the Mind is *rightly disposed*, and apprehends things as they *really are* in themselves, this *Perception* cannot be but where the *Agreement* is; but when thro' an *Indisposition* of its Faculties it apprehends things *otherwise* than they are, there, will then be a *Perception* of an *Agreement*, where *indeed* there is *no Agreement*; and this is the *Precise* and *formal Notion* of *Error*. As therefore in the other Case it matters not of what sort, or how disposed the *External Objects* are *in themselves*, provided our *Bodily Organs* receive from them that peculiar *Modification* which creates *sensible Pleasure*; so in the present Case, neither doth it signify of what sort the *Internal Objects* are in themselves, provided there be that *Perception* of an *Agreement* between them, which is the *Foundation* of *Rational Pleasure*. For every Effect being proportionable to its Cause, 'tis plain that whenever there is the same *Perception*, (whether it arises from a real Cause or no) there must be also the same *Pleasure*. *Silvius* indeed tells us, that Truth (f) gratifies the Understanding with a *Perception* naturally pleasant, which Percep-

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(f) P. 8.

tion is altogether wanting in Error. I would have thanked him if he would have told us what that Perception is. For my own part I can find no Perception which Truth gratifies the Mind with, besides that which I have now mentioned, viz. The Perception of an Agreement between one thing and another; nor can I discern any other Pleasure in simple Truth, but what arises from hence. And is there not the same Perception in Error? Why no; *Silvius* seems to be of Opinion that there is not; For an Imaginary Perception (says he) is indeed no Perception at all. If I could do it without offending him, I would once more tell him, that he knows not what he says. For what? Does he mean that the Perception of a thing which is Imaginary, i. e. which hath no real Existence, is no Perception? This is a Contradiction in Terms. Or by an Imaginary Perception, does he mean that which the Mind imagines only it hath a Perception of, but hath no Perception of? This is not Sense. For what is Imagination but Perception? If I imagine, i. e. if my Mind apprehends that the three Angles of a Triangle are equal to two right ones, I have then a Perception of this Equality; and so I have too if I apprehend them to be equal to two right ones and a half. In both these Cases there is a Perception of an Agreement between one thing and another; only in the one Case there is a Perception of an Agreement, where indeed there is no Agreement, and in the other the Perception of an Agreement where there is an Agreement; in the one Case the Perception arises from a right use, and in the other from an Indisposition of my Faculties. But tho' the Causes differ, the Perception is still the same; just as the Perception is the same, whether a Man looks on a yellow Object, or whether he has the Jaundice.— But why, you'll ask, this serious Trifling? Why do

do I thus gravely prove what the *Experience* of every one who has been convinced of an Error, will satisfy him about? Why only to return *Silvius* his Civility, and *satisfy him in his own way*, by opposing *Philosophy* (in the shortest manner I could think of) *against Philosophy*. This I confess is the farthest that my *Metaphysicks* will carry me; if *Silvius* likes them well enough to make them *his own*, he is welcome, and then he will be able to answer himself in every particular. But if not, and all this be no better than (g) *High Treason against the Truth*, the Case, I fear, will always go so bad with me, that there will be no way of saving me but by an *Act of Grace*.

But what avail such *Refinements* as these, unless it could be shewn that a *Sincere Papist* will not enjoy as much *Truth* hereafter as a *Sincere Protestant*? Will he then, or will he not? Why (b) *Ceteris paribus* (says *Silvius*) it seems not probable that he will. Modestly spoken; but the Reason. Why because his *Erroneous Belief* having fettered his *Mind*, and cramped his *Capacity* in some measure, he is hereby thrown back as it were, or at least hindered from making such a *Proficiency* as he otherwise might have done. Does not the Point clear up apace! Cramped, fettered, thrown back as it were, or at least hinder'd! *Silvius* I perceive is very much Cramped and Fettered, thrown back, or hindered in explaining himself. For what does all this, in plain *English* amount to? Why only to this, viz. That a Man under an erroneous Belief cannot make such a *Proficiency* (in *Knowledge* I suppose) as a Man under a true Belief. A worthy Reason! But where, when it is, that a *Sin-*

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(g) P. 10. (b) P. 12.

ere Papist cannot make this Proficiency ? Here or  
 hereafter ? If you say here, you say nothing to  
 the Purpose ; and if hereafter, I ask once more, Is  
 it necessary that a Papist should carry his Errors with  
 him into another World ? No, says Silvius ; It is  
 not to be doubted but his Religious Errors will be  
 done away, and perhaps all others : But (I pray  
 mind it) still if his Capacity has been checked or  
 straitned in this World, in all likelihood it will be  
 some disadvantage to him in the next. Tho' the De-  
 grees of the Saints Happiness hereafter will chiefly be  
 measured out by the Rule of their moral Improve-  
 ments, yet a good deal may depend upon their Intel-  
 lectual. Still you see we are straitned. He is not  
 unwilling to allow, that all Errors will be done a-  
 way in another World ; but if you ask whether  
 these Cramps and Fetters being removed, the Mind  
 will not be in as good a Capacity for the Enjoy-  
 ment of Truth, as it would have been had it ne-  
 ver erred ; no by no means ; and if you want to  
 know the Reason for it, it is, in all likelyhood it  
 will not be so ; and possibly it may not be so ! If  
 Silvius would accept of any good Advice from me,  
 it should be to be silent, when he cannot speak  
 to the Purpose. Who does not see by all this  
 Coldness and Hesitation, that he has a Work upon  
 his Hands which he cannot tell what to do with ?  
 I would by no means hereupon (as I perceive he  
 is apt to do) have him fall into a Passion with his  
 Understanding. His Understanding is not to blame,  
 but his Curiosity, which leads him to such Enquiries  
 as human Knowledge is not able to reach. That  
 Errors hinder our Improvements in Knowledge in  
 this Life, is I think more than enough evident.  
 But what effect will they have upon us in a Life  
 to come ; What will be the Condition of disemb-  
 bodied and glorified Spirits ; what the Proportion of  
 their Knowledge with Respect to one another ;  
 and

and upon what *Basis* this *Proportion* is founded ; these are Points which *Infinite Wisdom* alone can comprehend, and which therefore I will have no hand in determining, either one way or the other. But why do I say I *will not*, when, if *Silvius* may be believed, I have determined already ? I have said, it seems, that to imagine that the different States of Men in a Life to come, should not be adapted to their different Capacities, is to ascribe Weakness to the All-wise God. The words I own ; but methinks *Silvius* should for his own sake have forbore to mention them, since I cannot answer the Objection without repeating a Mistake of his ; one of the *weakest* I believe that ever dropt from the Pen of any Writer. The Case was this : *Silvius* had laid it down for Truth, that Two Christians may be supposed equally rewarded, and yet not equally happy ; which he endeavoured to support by this Instance, *viz.* That of Two Persons vested, each of them with the Government of Ten Cities (and so equally rewarded) one might be more happy than the other, as being better qualified for so great a Post. My Answer to this strange Assertion was intended to shew, that the Instance was by no means parallel ; for that every Man's State in a Life to come would certainly be adapted to his Capacity, (i. e. no Man should be put into a Post which he should nor be qualified to fill) and that to suppose the contrary, was to ascribe Weakness to the All-wise God. And what is all this now to the Business in hand ? What tendency has this to maintain, that the Capacities of Men for greater Degrees of Glory in a Life to come, will in any Measure depend upon the Improvements of their Knowledge in this ? *Silvius* frequently puts me in mind of the Pleasure I receive from my Mistakes ; I wish he does not find much more Pleasure in his Misrepresentations.

One thing I observed under this Head, which *Silvius* has thought fit to take no notice of, *viz.* That his Argument relating only to *Simple* or *Abstracted Truth*, is as good to prove that it will redound to the *Spiritual Advantage* of a *Papist*, to be instructed in the *Mathematicks*, as to be instructed in the *Doctrines* of *Religion*. I will now beg leave to add, that it is much *better*. For here is no hazzard of raising *Doubts* and *Scruples*, and certainly, if you consider *merely* the *extent* of *Knowledge*, a Man may receive greater *Improvements* from the *Theorems* of *Euclid*, than he can from the *Doctrines*, and *Precepts* of the Gospel; or at least more than he can from being set right in his *Notions* about the *Invocation* of *Saints*, *Purgatory*, *Transubstantiation*, and the like. The Reason extends it self proportionably to *all Arts* and *Sciences*, as may very easily be thus demonstrated. Every *Art* or *Science* (i) implies an *Acquisition* of *Knowledge*; and every *Acquisition* of *Knowledge* proportionably improves and augments a *Man's Capacity*; and every *Advantage* of *Capacity* proportionably qualifies a *Man* for a larger *Enjoyment* of *Truth*; and so on. This is the *Golden Chain*! And is it not, think you, a very notable way of solving the present *Difficulty*, about *Converting* a *Papist*, to have recourse to an Argument which makes it every whit as reasonable to put him out to an *Artificer* to learn a *Trade*, as to send him to a *Divine* for *Instruction*? I wish *Silvius* would put his own *Rules* in *Practice*, and try to *edify* *Mankind*, by teaching *Simple Truths*. Let them be as *simple* as he pleases, he will, so far

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(i) P. 12.

as I am able to judge, do more good by them, than he is likely to do by his *Divinity*.

Here ends the Argument, *which turns upon the Pleasure and Advantage of Truth in general*; what follows under this Head, is for the most part intended to shew, that *Popery* is a great hindrance to the *Moral Improvements* of Men, and consequently that upon this Account the *Conversion* of a *Papist* must redound to his *Spiritual Advantage*. Those who have a mind to see the Arguments drawn out in *Mood and Figure*, may consult *Silvius*; I shall only set down the Substance of them, which is as follows, *viz.*

1. The Church of *Rome* (k) deprives its Members of the Use of the *Scriptures*, which are the Principal Means of Knowledge and Instruction.

2. It (l) inflicts severer Penalties on supposed false Doctrines, than notorious Immoralities, and consequently corrupts the Minds and Judgments of its Members.

3. It (m) Teaches and Practices the Invocation of Saints, which hinders the Love of God and true Devotion.

4. It (n) enjoyns such Rites and Ceremonies as naturally tend to the Prejudice and Disturbance of Divine Worship, which throws a great Obstacle in the Way of Mens Spiritual Improvements.

5. It (o) teaches and practices Persecution, which hinders Love and Charity.

These are the Arguments, by which, if *Silvius* proposes to shew that the Religion of *Papists* is a Method not so well adapted and fitted to lead Men to the Practice of *Vertue* and *Piety*, as the Religion

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(k) P. 18. (l) P. 19. (m) Ibid. and p. 14. 15. 16.  
(n) P. 20. (o) P. 21.

of Protestants, he is in a very safe and easy way. But if he means to prove the *Nature* of Popery to be such, as that there is *no room*, or *Possibility* for a Papist, how *Sincere* and *Honest* soever he be, to make such *Moral Improvements* as shall qualify him for as great a *Degree* of *Happiness* hereafter, (so far I mean as *mere* Moral Improvements are considered in the Case) as a *Protestant* may qualify himself for : If this, I say, be his Meaning, (which is the Point in question) in my humble Opinion he is only Disputing against Matter of *Fact*. For the clearing of this Point, I beg it may be considered, *what sort* of *Moral Improvements* those are which may be supposed to *Qualify*, or *Capacitate* Men for greater *Degrees* of *Happiness* hereafter. They who talk sensibly upon the Subject, say thus ; That forasmuch as all *Happiness* consists in the *Agreement*, or due *Proportion* between the *Subject* and the *Object* ; therefore those must be qualified for the *greatest Degrees* of *Happiness* in *Heaven*, whose Souls are most of all *disposed* to *taste* and *relish* that sort of *Pleasure*, in which the *Happiness* of *Heaven* does consist. Now the *Pleasures* of *Heaven* are of a *Pure*, *Spiritual* Nature, most *opposite* to those which arise from the Gratification of our *Sensual Appetites* ; and consequently by how much the more *cool* a Man is in his *Affections* towards *Earthly Things* ; by how much the more he *divests* himself, as it were, of *Flesh* and *Blood* ; by how much the more he *loves God*, *delights* in the *Prospect* of, and *longs* after the *Enjoyment* of his *Happiness* ; by so much the *greater Degrees* of *that Happiness* he is qualify'd for. In a word, the whole *Compass* of *Moral Qualifications*, considered as proper to *capacitate* us for greater *Glories*, will (so far as we at present can judge any thing of the Matter) fall under that one complex

Notion, *Heavenly-mindedness*. And let me then ask of *Silvius*; Is all the *Piety* which has ever been observed in the *Church of Rome*, mere out-side *Formality*? And have we not had as great *Examples* of *Heavenly-mindedness* in that *Communion*, as we have ever had in any *Communion* among *Protestants*? Let it not be thought that I am pleading the Cause of *Popery*; but I hope I may without Offence, mention those *Vertues* which have shone forth in some of its *Members*, and appeal to the *Examples* of such as an Evidence; how much is practicable, even under all its *Corruptions*, by those whom this Question concerns, truly *Sincere* and *Upright Men*. There have been those then among them, as well as among our selves, of whom it might have been said, that in *Labours* they were more abundant, in *Perils* often, in *Weariness* and *Painfulness*, in *Watchings* often, in *Cold*, and in *Nakedness*. There have been those who thro' the *Vigour* of a *Lively Faith*, the *Love* of *God*, and the *Contemplation* of those *Glories* which shall hereafter be revealed, have raised themselves above this *World*, and had their *Conversation* in *Heaven*, whilst they were *Strangers* here upon *Earth*. And what weight can the *Subtilties* of *Men* have against such *Instances* as these? Do they tell us, and would they *Logically* prove to us, what a *Sincere Papist* CANNOT do? We shew them by a much more easy and certain way, that so far as we are capable of judging from what has often been experienced, what they say cannot be done, has been done. The *Truth* indeed seems to be this; That tho' these *Doctrines* and *Practises* of the *Church of Rome*, do in general tend to corrupt *Men's Minds*, and in *Fact*, very frequently hinder the *Moral Improvements* of its *Members*; yet that this Effect is not necessary and unavoidable; and therefore it cannot reach the

the Behaviour of those among them who are *Sincere* and *Upright*, so as to render them less qualify'd (so far as *mere Morality* is a Qualification) for the Rewards of a Life to come. If this Effect be not *necessary*, it may then by a *due Care* be prevented : Now *Sincerity* supposeth this *Care* ; a *Sincere Man*, in the present Question, being one who is supposed to be under such a Sense of his *Duty*, and such Apprehensions of the Rewards of a *Life* to come, as to apply his *best* and *utmost* Endeavour, both to *know* the Will of God, and to *live obediently* thereto. This may be applied not only to *Papists*, but to *Sincere Persons* in many other (however Erroneous) *Seets* of Religion. And what has *Silvius* (for he foresaw the Objection) done to show the contrary ? Why according to custom he tells us, that (p) *SINCERE Men MAY BE in some measure seduced, and deluded by such means*——*PERHAPS they may baffle great Degrees of Care and Industry.* That (q) *it CANNOT BE EXPECTED that Sincerity should be able to withstand entirely.*——That it (r) *IS NOT IN THE POWER of any private PAPIST, however SINCERE, wholly to prevent*——That (s) *IN ALL PROBABILITY it may be weakened*——*IN ALL LIKELIHOOD it will be stopped and with-held.* This is all that I can any where find to the Purpose ; and the whole amounts to thus much, and no more, *viz.* That a truly *Sincere* and *Upright Heart* will not prevent these *Evil Effects*, because——*it will not ; or because perhaps, possibly, probably, and in all likelihood it may not !* But let *Silvius* assign some Reason why *Sincerity* should not always act uniformly, and in a manner agreeable to its self.

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(p) P. 19. (q) P. 20. (r) Ibid. (s) P. 21.

Why the same good Disposition of Mind which leads a Man with the *utmost* Care and *Diligence* to know the Will of God, should not be as effectual in regulating every part of his *Behaviour*, and leading him to all possible Improvements. Or, why when a Man has used his *best Endeavours* to guard against these *Impediments*, they must nevertheless necessarily prove *Stumbling-blocks* to him in his way towards *Moral Perfection*. Let *Silvius*, I say, assign some good Reason for either of these, and he shall be heard; but if he cannot do it, he had better keep his *Peradventures* to himself. How (t) we *lovers of Truth* may relish such sort of Arguing, I cannot say; but certainly those who understand Sense, will not be thus imposed upon.

But the last of these Objections, relating to the Doctrine of *Persecution*, ought to be more particularly spoken to, because *Silvius's* Management of it seems to be somewhat extraordinary. Having put the Question (u) *How far SINCERE Papists may be affected by it*, he immediately observes, that PERSECUTION is such a *flagrant Violation of the Law of Nature*, that it cannot be CONSISTENT with SINCERITY; and that to a SINCERE Person nothing CAN dissolve the Obligation of loving his fellow Creatures, i. e. (for this is what he means) No Sincere Person can think himself disengaged from this Obligation. Is not this fine Reasoning! The Point is, whether a Sincere Papist may not make as great *Moral Improvements* as a Sincere Protestant. No, says *Silvius*, he cannot. But why? Why because the Church of Rome teacheth and practiseth *Persecution*. Now if you

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(t) P. 11. (u) P. 21.

should think it proper to ask, whether a *Sincere* Papist can Teach or Practice *Persecution*, you have it from his own Mouth, that he can do neither. For *Persecution*, he tells us, is *inconsistent* with *Sincerity*; and a *Sincere* Man cannot but think himself obliged to love his Fellow Creatures. That is to say, a *Sincere* Papist is supposed to be incapacitated to make as great *Moral Improvements* as a *Sincere* Protestant; for a Reason, which he neither is, nor can be any way concerned in! He neither doth, nor can approve of *Persecution*, and yet he cannot improve so well, because of the *Doctrine* of *Persecution*! What Sense there is in this, let any ordinary Reader judge. But it is not without Reason taken for granted by *Silvius*, that a Man may be a *Papist*, and yet not hold the *Doctrine* of *Persecution*. For tho' *Persecution* be both Taught and Practised in the Church of Rome, 'tis yet no Article of Communion that I know of. The Governors of that Church think it not only Lawful, but their Duty to *Persecute* those who separate from them; but this doth not necessarily affect the Behaviour of *Private Members*, and if I may have leave to speak what I think, I believe that there are thousands in that Communion who no more approve of this Unchristian Method of dealing with their Fellow-Creatures, than *Silvius* or I do. This Consideration therefore is impertinently brought into the Argument. For if it be Supposed, that a *Sincere* Papist may, and does hold the *Doctrine* of *Persecution*, and that he is hereby unavoidably hindered from making such *Moral Improvements*, as he otherwise might; what is it that hinders? Why plainly not any thing which is Essential to his Profession, consider'd as a *Private Person*, but something which is *accidental*

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to it. It is not merely his being a *Papist*, but his holding a *Doctrine* which he might *not* hold *consistently* with his being a *Papist*. But the *Objection* has not the least *Colour* in it; if you say that a *Sincere* *Papist* cannot consistently with his *Sincerity* hold the *Doctrine* of *Persecution*; which whether it be true or not, it is no Part of my *Business* now to inquire.

I have said as much as I think it proper for me to say, in answer to *Silvius's* *Objections*, and he must now give me leave to (y) *hope* in my turn, that what has been offered contains a *Satisfactory Answer* to that *Question*; *What good can you do a Papist* (supposed to be *Sincere*) *by converting him*? If the *Argument* does not (which yet I conceive it does) come fully up to what I intend by it, the difference at least will appear so very *small*, that a wise Man will hardly think it a *Sufficient Ballance* against those *Difficulties* you may bring a *Papist* under, if after all your *Endeavours* you should not be able to convert him. But, says *Silvius*, (z) *If Popery was no disadvantage to the Professors of it, yet there would be Sufficient Reason to endeavour their Conversion, because Popery is a great Stumbling-Block to Atheists, Deists, Pagans &c.* How far *Popery* is an *Obstruction* to the *Conversion* of *Infidels*; there is no need for me now to inquire. I shall only say this, that if there were any tolerable prospect of effecting a *General Conversion* from *Popery*, we should not then want *Arguments* to make it *Reasonable* to attempt it. But so long as there are no hopes of this, the *Argument* is manifestly of no weight: For tho' you should convert here

(y) p. 18.

(z) p. 17.

and there a *Papist*, yet if notwithstanding this whole Nations will continue to be *Papists* still, the *Stumbling-block* will be the same that it was before. Yea, but the *Conversion* of one single *Papist* is one step towards the accomplishing so good a *Work*. Without doubt; and so is the removal of one single *Stone*, one step towards removing a *Mountain*. But if any Man in Vertue of this Reasoning should employ his Time in fetching *Stones* from the *Alps*, I doubt he would be reckoned either a *Fool* or a *Madman* for his Pains.

Upon the whole then; Forasmuch as *Silvius* has called upon me (a) once more to tell him whether I think that there is any Sense in attempting to Convert a *Papist* on the *Bishop's Principle*, I do now once more tell him, that there is none. I have according to his desire given him some plain Reasons why I will not grant to him this Point; not solicitous whether he now thinks I have reason to say that it is too hard for him, or not. If not, I shall oblige him yet farther, being resolved to (b) take no more fruitless Pains, by resuming a Point which I cannot pretend to say any thing more satisfactory about, and which if *Silvius* could gain, it would be no advantage to the main Cause in which he is concerned. You pretend, Sir, to be a great Lover of Truth; be pleased to attend a little, for I am now going to deal with you as such. You lay it down in the beginning of your Book, that (c) If the Doctrine of Sincerity renders the Conviction of Erroneous and De-luded Men, an impracticable thing, and even makes it absurd and unreasonable to endeavour it, it must necessarily sink under the Weight of such a Difficulty.

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(a) p. 22. (b) p. 11. (c) p. 4.

This is your own Rule; and here is a very plain Confession, that if the *Difficulty* here mentioned cannot be remov'd, your Case is gone. Here then I lay my Finger, and will very quickly give you as fair an Opportunity as you can desire of trying your *Ingenuity*.

In the first place then we must consider what the *Difficulty* is which the Cause requires should be removed; and this he tells us, is, that *it is an absurd and unreasonable thing* (I leave out *Impracticable*, because, as has been shewn, it is no part of the *Difficulty*) *to endeavour to Convert, not merely Papists, but Erroneous and Deluded MEN in general; so that the Cause must necessarily sink, if any one false Religion* (for he would be understood, I suppose, to speak of *Religious Errors*) *can be assigned; the Conversion of a Man from which the Bishop's Doctrine of Sincerity makes it Absurd and Unreasonable to attempt.* Thus far *Silvius* speaks like a Man of Sense; for the main Point indeed is, not whether upon the Bishop's Principle, it is unreasonable to attempt to Convert a Man from *this or that* false Religion, but *indefinitely from any false Religion.* The *Papists* were indeed particularly mentioned by the *Dean*, because, I suppose, they first occur'd to his Thoughts; for 'tis evident, and *Silvius* here allows, that had he instanced in any *other false Religion*, the *Difficulty* would have been the *very same.* Now pray consider, by what sort of Arguments *Silvius* has endeavoured to shew, that it is reasonable to attempt the *Conversion* of a *Papist* upon his Lordship's Principles; and if you look back, you will find that the main Stress of the Cause is made to rest upon certain Corruptions peculiar to the Church of Rome, which are conceived to hinder the *Moral Improvement* of its Members. Supposing then, but not granting

ting this to be the Case, I ask of *Silvius* ; Can he not conceive *Popery* stript of those *Corruptions*, and yet still to remain a *false Religion* ? Or in other Words, cannot he conceive a *false Religion* so constituted as that (so far as mere *Morality* is considered) there shall be room for the *same Improvements* as under the *true* ? If he can (and certainly he may) his Arguments from *Moral Improvements* will all be set aside. And if after this he can be brought to see (and I trust it will require no farther Pains to make him see) that his other Arguments are good for nothing ; here then will be a *false Religion*, from which upon his Lordship's Principle you can have *no reason* to endeavour to Convert a Man, and the Cause of Consequence will be *lost*, by his own Confession.

It had been exactly to the same purpose, if it had been put to his Lordship: *With what Reason can your Lordship attempt the Conversion of a DEIST, or a JEW, upon your Principle ?* And yet here 'tis plain that *Silvius's* Reasoning can have no place ; for the *Deist*, who believes in the *Existence* and *Providence* of *God*, and expects a *Reward*, in Vertue of his *Obedience* to the *Law of Morality*, has all the encouragement in the World to improve in *Morality*. The same may be said of a *Jew*, who expects *Salvation* in Vertue of his *Obedience* to the *Law of Moses* ; because the *Moral Law* is a part of the *Law of Moses*. And neither of these Perswasions are liable to those Objections which *Silvius* has made against *Popery*. I know well enough, that his Lordship does not care to own, that his Doctrine about *Sincerity* reaches to such ; and *Silvius*, under his Lordship's Protection, now tells me, not without some very warm Reflections upon my *Honesty* and

*Modesty*, that (d) *The Bishop's Maxim* relates only to professed sincere Christians. One would think that this Gentleman meant to carry his Point merely by the dint of *Assurance*; for he offers not one word of Proof for what he says, but only very positively asserts it. If this be the Case, I do assure him, that whatever he may think of me, I am by no means a Match for him; but if he is willing to argue, let him go to p. 44, 45, 46, of the *Preface* to my *Appeal* (which he seems never yet to have read) and he may find some Employment. What his Lordship meant to teach, is no body's concern, that I know of but *his own*; but this I do say, and this so long as I have Eyes to Read, and Sense to understand, I must say, that his Lordship's *Maxim* includes all Sincere Persons without Exception; and that every one of the Arguments made use of by him to support his Proposition, conclude with equal strength in favour of all sincere Persons, whether *Christian*, or not *Christian*. If his Lordship will not now justify this, why is he not so ingenuous as to own it? Why doth he not alter his *Proposition*; and retract his *Reasoning*? Whenever he will be pleased to do thus much Justice to the Cause, I promise him I shall be ready to accept his *Recantation*; and I give it him under my Hand, that he shall thenceforward be pressed with no Consequences by me, but such as relate to *Sincere Christians*. But till this is done, the Charge will, and ought to stand full against him; and I must beg of his Lordship to be excused, if I cannot accept of an *I did not think on't*, on the one hand, as an equivalent to the strongest Evidence

that either *Words* or *Arguments* can give on the other.

I shall do *Silvius* a Pleasure, perhaps, by observing, that as to this Particular, he is under the very same Circumstances with his Lordship. *His Arguments*, in which he hath closely followed the Bishop, stand yet *uncancelled*; and tho' he no where expressly *extends* the *Doctrine* of *Sincerity* beyond Christians, yet neither doth he any where expressly *confine* it to them.—— But I will beg leave to put one Question more, which I am sure neither of them will find fault with; and that is, *With what Reason* can you attempt to Convert a *DISSENTER* upon his Lordship's Principles? These are *Christians*, I hope, and amidst all the Complaints of the want of *Means*, and *Opportunities* of *Improvement* in the Church of Rome, I hear none about the want of them in a *Protestant Conventicle*. What good then I ask can you do to a *Dissenter* by *Converting* him? Why plainly, none at all; and if you say that there is reason to attempt his Conversion, because *Divisions* generally occasion the *Breach* of *Charity* among Christians; I answer, that if this be all, the end may be as well answered by *Instructing* Christians better. The *Dissenters*, I hope, want no *Charity* to the Church of England, tho' they think themselves oblig'd to *separate* from her. Ask them, and they will tell you so. And if we want *Charity* towards them, I hope we are capable of being convinced of the *Unreasonableness* of it. But whether we are or not, why, I pray, should the *Dissenters* suffer for our want of *Charity*? Why should they be disturbed in the quiet Enjoyment of their *Sincerely* embraced *Errors*, and put to the fruitless hazard and Pains of seeking out a new Religion, merely because some ill disposed Men

Men take up unreasonable *Prejudices* against them ?

When *Silvius* has considered the Case of *Dissenters*, I would desire him to take one Step more, and consider the Case of sincere *Arians* and *Socinians*. For my self, I must own that I am not without Suspicion, that this Modern Doctrine of *Sincerity* was raised to countenance these *Errors* ; and if *Silvius* can shew upon his own Principles the Reasonableness and Necessity of endeavouring to Convert these Men, tho' he may not perhaps *justify* his Doctrine of *Sincerity*, yet he will undoubtedly ease it of a Weight, which, by his own Confession, if not removed, must sink it.

These are the Points which I propose to *Silvius*, considered as a *Lover of Truth* ; and I may venture to stand by his own Determination, provided he really is what he pretends to be. I must now hasten to the other part of his Book, upon which, not purposing to tire my Reader, I cannot be so full and particular as I have been upon the first. But as I cannot so, to my great Comfort, I need not.

At p. 15. of my *Preface*, I cited (from Bishop Burnet) a Rule of Mahomet, That all Men, in all Religions are equally acceptable to God, if they serve him faithfully in them ; which appearing to me exactly to come up to the Bishop of Bangor's Doctrine, I said, one would be apt to think that his Lordship transcribed it from the Alcoran. I used not this as an *Argument*, nor did I speak it to *Reproach* the Bishop, as *Silvius* seems to fancy. But I did it to make Men cautious upon what sort of Proofs they admitted of a Doctrine, which (as I hoped) I had sufficiently shewn, had no good ones to support it, and which was introduced by a grand Impostor, on purpose (as it should

should seem) to take Men off from any especial Regard to Christianity, and to make way for his own new Scheme. What now says *Silvius*? Why he tells me (how decently you may see, if you please) that in the first place, (e) *This is NOT the Bishop's Maxim, but a CONSEQUENCE drawn from it, which perhaps the Bishop does not see*; and in the next place, that if it be the Bishop's Maxim, 'tis MY OWN, as well as the Bishop's. The Truth of these Particulars will depend upon the Sense of *Mahomet's Maxim*; for which I shall beg leave again to refer to Bishop *Burnet*, supposing him to have been a competent Judge of the Matter, and because I have not the *Alcoran* by me to go to. Thus then he concludes the Point (*Expos. Art. 18.*) "It is therefore enough to fix this according to the Design of the Article, That it is not free to Men to chuse at Pleasure what Religion they will, as if — ALL Religions were ALIKE." He had been disputing all along against the *Maxim* of *Mahomet*, above laid down, and concludes you see that all Religions are not alike. By consequence he understood the *Maxim* of *Mahomet*, as declaring, that all Religions are alike. If *Silvius* wants any farther Satisfaction about the Sense of the Bishop's Proposition, he may go to those who are disposed to give it him. For he ought to have taken notice, that (tho' I might very well have done it) yet I do not state the Comparison barely between the *Maxim* of *Mahomet*, and the Bishop's Proposition; but between the *Maxim* of *Mahomet* and the Bishop's Doctrine. His DOCTRINE, I said, one would be apt to conclude, was transcribed from the *Alcoran*. Now his Doctrine is to be ga-

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(e) P. 25.

thered, not *barely* from his *Proposition*, but from the *whole* of what he hath written upon the Subject. The Bishop's *Doctrine* then, if I can understand, sets forth thus much, *viz.* That *ALL Sincere Persons* (for there is no Exception made) *whatever Method of Religion they follow, are entitled to equal Happiness hereafter, if they be equally Sincere*: And what is this, but in other words to say, That *all Religions are alike*? If you will call this a *Consequence*, 'tis such a *Consequence* as no Man can avoid *seeing*, who is able to see at all: But in my Judgment, it is not a *Consequence*, but the Maxim *it self*, expressed in a *different manner*. But is this *my Maxim*, as well as the Bishop's? Have I any where said, that *all Religions are alike*? *Silvius* upon this Occasion asks, whether I *CAN blush*; and takes great pleasure in repeating the Question. I have so much Charity for him, as to *believe* that HE can; and if one may judge by his manner of Writing, *this is the Reason* why he cares not to *shew his Face*.

After this Ruffle, *Silvius*, all of a sudden grows (f) *pleased*; and it is such a great rarity to find him so, that had not his *Pleasure* been too *ill-natured*, I should have been *pleased* too. Now the *Pleasure* is, that I should be *Civil to the Character of a Bishop*; which, had I not been conscious to my self, that the thing was impossible, would have raised in me a violent Suspicion, that I had somewhere or other dropt some severe words against *Episcopacy*. But upon reading the very next words, *ESPECIALLY Bishop BURNET*, I quickly perceived that this Gentleman has not yet found out the Secret of distinguishing between the *Character of a Bishop*, and the *Person*

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(f) Ibid.

of a *Bishop*; for what difference there is between the *Episcopal Character* of Doctor *Burnet*, and the *Episcopal Character* of another Man, I profess I do not see. But I should be loath to be thought *Uncivil*, even to the *Person* of a *Bishop*; nor do I know that I have been so. If the *Bishop* of *Bangor* (for he I suppose is next at Heart) has any *Personal Failings*, the World knows I have never enter'd into them; and if he has laid me under a necessity of observing some things in his Writings, not very favourable to his *Personal Character*, *Silvius* knows, or may know, upon whom the Blame of that must fall.—But I go on; he is so well pleased with my *Encomium* upon *Bishop Burnet* (he should have said upon *Bishop Burnet's Reflection*) that he is almost tempted to let it pass unmolested; yet (such is the Force of *De-lusion*) he could not do it without making the following Remark. *Bishop Burnet* (says he) speaks with dislike of a certain *Supposition*, the substance of which *Mr. Stebbing* has expressly granted.—And yet he tells us, that nothing can be more just than this *Reflection*. And for the Proof of this, *Silvius* makes HIMSELF answerable, if I find it needful, after I have compared the Concession made, Page 181. of my Appeal with the *Reflection* of *Bishop Burnet*. Why so very shy Sir? Why this News of a Discovery, and the Reader yet left in the dark? If I have in one place allowed of a *Supposition* of *Bishop Burnet's*, which I disallow in another, why were not the Passages produced to open view, and set one against the other? I guess at the Reason. *Silvius* was afraid that the World should be apprized that *Bishop Burnet* has spoken less favourably of *Sincerity* than I have. I shall not go about to undeceive him in this; but since he has put me upon looking out my Mistake, shall think

it enough to desire him to look *once more* ; and see if he cannot find out *his own*. For my own part I have diligently compared the places, and do sincerely profess to him, that I find nothing at all of any such matter as he speaks of.

We are now coming to a Matter of much greater Consequence. At p. 27. he is much disturbed that I have *shewn the Danger and Inconveniencies of the Bishop's Doctrine* ——— Surely (says he) *the Question is not, Whether ill-disposed Men may not make a bad use of the Doctrine of Sincerity. — He knows perfectly well that this Argument either proves nothing, or almost every thing.* I was afraid what use would be made of my setting forth the *ill Consequences of the Bishop's Doctrine*, and therefore I took care *expressly to guard against it*, by telling the Reader that (g) *the use that I intended from it, was (not to prove the Bishop's Doctrine to be false, but) ONLY to observe, that IF IT HAS no Foundation the World cannot be too well apprized of it.* There are some Falshoods which it is not worth a Man's while to confute. *Silvius's Book contains a great many such.* But *this Falshood is attended with such ill Consequences, that it ought to be confuted; and I therefore set forth these ill Consequences in order (as I said) to justify my self in undertaking to confute it.* What a sad Misfortune is it, that this Gentleman, who is apt to be so angry at being told of his Mistakes, should not be able to set so much as one Step right! — But pray mark what follows; *There is another*

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(g) *Prof. to my Appeal, p. 18.*

Point, which tho' Mr. Stebbing has very prudently overlook'd, yet I think it highly fitting to be laid before the Reader. I mean the Dangers and Inconveniencies attending the Doctrine of fixing Eternal Salvation upon TOO RIGID ORTHODOXY. Why he took not the least notice of these, is a Secret, not fit to be pry'd into. — But I shall produce them, &c. Pray now, Reader, consider what it is upon which I have fixed the *Eternal Salvation* of Men, *i. e.* (for *Silvius*, I perceive, must always be told of it) *their Title to Eternal Salvation*; and you will find it to be neither more nor less than this, *viz.* The *Receiving*, or *Embracing* those *Doctrines* concerning Salvation, which *Jesus Christ* came to declare, and the *living Obediently* to his *Commandments*. The former of these is what this Gentleman calls *too rigid Orthodoxy*. Be it so; yet he knows that I thought it *not too rigid*. And should I then set forth the *Dangers* and *Inconveniencies* of fixing *Eternal Salvation* upon *those Terms*, upon which (as I am verily perswaded) *Christ himself* has fixed it? I hope in God I never shall attempt it. The Reason of this such Writers as *Silvius* may pry into, but it cannot be a Secret to those who have any Sense of *Decency*. But has *Silvius* done any thing to shew, that this is *too rigid Orthodoxy*? Why no; he thinks (b) it becomes him *purposely* to defer the *Work*, in order to see whether the whole Book be not undertaken by some *abler Hand*. I fear there is something else at bottom; for *Modesty* is always like it self; and since (as he confesses) this is a Point which calls for some *able Hand*, it would have taught him not to have been so *hasty* in throwing about his *Consequences*, lest if happily this *able Hand* should not

(b) P. 3.

Come forth and do the Work at last, these *Reproaches* should fall, not upon *me*, but upon the *Author* of the *Gospel*. It will make the Case still worse, when you consider in what strong Terms this Charge is laid. I, when I was representing the *Dangers* and *Inconveniencies* of the *Doctrine* of *Sincerity*, contented my self with saying, that considering the *Tempers* and *Dispositions* of Men, it *might* have; and would *be apt* to have such and such *ill Effects*; I never dared to say, nor did I ever think that these *Effects* must *certainly*, and *necessarily* follow; yea, I (i) *expressly* declared my self against it. But *Silvius*, without the least Reserve, or Hesitation, declares that (k) the *Inconveniencies* belonging to this *Doctrine* about ORTHODOXY (I hope he means no *Ridicule* by that Word) are not ACCIDENTAL, but ESSENTIAL and UNAVOIDABLE. That it CAN have no GOOD Effects, MAY have many BAD ones, and MUST have SOME SUCH! Where all this will end, let *Silvius* look to it. For my own part I know not, nor, (God be thanked) did it ever enter into my Heart to suspect such dreadful Consequences.—But *Silvius* has promised to produce them, and he is the fittest Person.

Hear him then (if you can) with Patience. It (the *Doctrine* about Orthodoxy (naturally tends to make Men stupid, indolent, and unconcerned about the Truths of Religion. It often commits them to the Direction of Chance, or something worse. That is to say, Because the *Doctrine* about Orthodoxy, (as he calls it) teaches Men, that their Title to Salvation DEPENDS upon their embracing the Truths of Religion; THEREFORE it naturally tends to make

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(i) Pref. p. 17. (k) P. 28.

them *Stupid, Indolent, and Unconcerned* about those *Truths* ! And not only so ; but forasmuch as *Silvius* has declared before, that the *Inconveniences* belonging to this Doctrine are not *Accidental*, but *Essential* and *Unavoidable*, therefore these Effects must *Essentially*, and *Unavoidably* follow ! But what does *Silvius* mean, when he says that, this Doctrine *commits Men to Chance* ? It commits them, he knows, to the *Word of God*. And is it then *Chance*, whether by the help of *God's Word*, a Man understands those *Truths* relating to *Salvation*, which *Jesus Christ* came to declare ? Why yes ; It is a (l) mere *Contingency* ; insomuch that if you fix our Title to *Salvation* upon this Foot, (m) not one in ten Thousand, (speaking of *Christians*, and supposing them all to be as careful about their Duty as they ought to be) CAN be entitled to it ; and it may justly be doubted, whether any *UNINSPIRED Man* EVER WAS, or EVER WILL be so ! He talks of something worse ; if any thing can be worse, here it is. (n) *ORTHODOXY*, especially so universal as *Mr. Stebbing* requires, is *SELDOM*, if EVER in a Man's Power, and by consequence it is *UNPROFITABLE*, and *INSIGNIFICANT* to ENDEAVOUR after it. That is, it is *seldom*, if ever in a Man's Power to understand and believe those *Truths* relating to the *Salvation* of Men, which *Jesus Christ* came to declare, and therefore it is *unprofitable*, and *insignificant* to attempt it ! If this be Truth, God have Mercy upon us ! Well might *Silvius* say, that the fixing Men's Title to *Salvation* upon this Foot, (o) tends to fill Men's Minds with endless *Inquietudes*, and *Perplexities* ! But till it be proved to be

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(l) P. 25. (m) P. 26. (n) P. 29. (o) P. 28.

Truth (which as yet is not so much as attempted ; tho' it be confidently affirmed to be (p) demonstrable) he shall stand with me as a *Blasphemer of God's Holy Word*. He says, that *this Point deserves to be treated of distinctly, and at large ;* and thus far I agree with him, that either he ought to have said a great deal more, or he ought to have said *nothing*. If *Silvius* thinks it proper to enter upon the Defence of so noble a Cause, let him begin as soon as he pleases. But it will be but just that he tells us his *Name*, that if he cannot (as I hope I need not say, I am perswaded he cannot) make good his Point, he may take to himself the *Shame* that belongs to such *Enterprizers*.

What follows, is not less surprizing. He tells me, that (q) it is a *sad Prostitution of the Divine Favour*, to represent it as following such *Qualifications as are* ALTOGETHER WORTHLESS. If it be considered again what those *Qualifications* are, which I have represented the *Divine Favour* as following, you cannot help concluding, that this Writer cares not what it is that he *Prostitutes*. For doth he not therein *reproach* HIMSELF, who hath said so many fine things of *simple, abstracted Truth*? \* Who hath told us that (r) every Step we take in sound Knowledge, may upon the single account of those *Improvements* it makes of our *Faculties*, be reckoned a *Spiritual Gain*, as the Progress we make in *Religious Knowledge* is a *double Gain*. But what is worse, doth he not by this, and by all that he hath now said, *Reproach* our *Blessed Lord*, and his *Apostles*, who came, and were sent to teach ; and doth he not *Reproach* the most *Wise*,

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(p) p. 26. (q) p. 29. (r) p. 13 14.

and *Holy God*, by whose *Will* and *Appointment* they were sent to Teach that *Faith*, the *Knowledge* whereof he yet declares to be a *Qualification* altogether *Worthless*; which it is a mere *Contingency*, whether a *Man* understands, which *not one in ten Thousand* CAN understand; and which therefore to endeavour to understand, is *unprofitable*, and *insignificant*? See here, my Lord, what an Advocate you have got; and by what *Methods* your Cause is to be supported! Was I mistaken, when I told *Silvius* that his Reasoning would bring him at last to downright *Scepticism*? The Gentleman pretends to be a Christian, and without such a Pretence, he could with no sort of Grace have stepped forth as a Friend, either to your Lordship, or your Cause. But, my Lord, I speak it with great Seriousness and Concern, whatever Degree of Faith he set out with, he seems in a fair way to lose it all in Pursuit of these Principles.

After this Insult upon the Gospel, he again falls upon me, and calls me forth once more to justify my *Interpretation* of the Bishop's *Proposition*. As to this I must beg his Pardon; it is not in my Power to say any thing plainer than I have already said, and if *Silvius* cannot be made to understand plain things, I am sorry for it. The best Advice that I can give him, is to let the Matter rest a while, and give his *Faculties* leave to recover themselves. It is a general Observation, that after much poring, the longer a Man looks, the worse he sees; and this seems to be *Silvius's* Case. At first he took the thing right enough, and understood the *Proposition* in every one of those Particulars, which he now quarrels with me about, as I understood it, and as every body else understood it. But now we are quite and clean  
asunder;

asunder, and for ought I can perceive, the more closely I should pursue him, the farther I should be off. I took notice of this once before, and *Silvius* has marked me out, as a very *Impertinent*, and *Saucy Fellow* for my Pains. (s) *Nothing*, says he, *can be less to the Purpose than Mr. Stebbing's observing, that SILVIUS is one of those who once supposed, that his Lordship's Proposition did relate.——'Tis NO NEWS that SILVIUS once committed a Mistake.——He has done it to my knowledge very often; and is now grown so hardened, that he is not ASHAMED.——I doubt not but the honest Reader will be in haste to congratulate Mr. Stebbing upon his SINGULAR MODESTY in this Particular, as well as some others.* Sir, If you be one that a Man may speak to without Offence, I do, with the utmost Deference and Submission to your *unknown Excellency*, beg leave to represent to you, that it was *very much to the Purpose*, to observe, that his Lordship's Friends (and especially so considerable an Advocate as *SILVIUS*) had all of them agreed with me in the Sense of those Particulars, in which his Lordship was pleased to differ from me. Not that I mean to pin you down to your first Sense; no, forasmuch as the Cause requires it, and because I perceive you are some great Man, you shall have the liberty to *say, and unsay, to confess, and deny, with Reason, or without Reason*, just as you please. You shall moreover be allowed the full *Benefit* of his Lordship's Pardon, (which it must be owned you have very signally merited) and be permitted to (t) *think your self very safe, as knowing that his Lordship (having committed so many Mistakes himself) never uses to con-*

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(s) P. 37. (t) P. 38.

*demn Men for involuntary Oversights.* But then I must beg you would give the Reader leave to infer that this *first Sense*, in which you and all the World besides agreed, is the most *plain and obvious Sense*; at least till such time as you shall lay your *Commands* upon us to believe, *that* to be the most *plain and obvious Sense* of a Passage, in which that Passage is *least apt* to be understood. If such a Representation as this infers a want of *Modesty*, it is by no means fitting that I should *presume* to dispute the Point with you *anew*; and besides there is another Reason which makes it not proper, *viz.* That admitting I had mistaken the Sense of his Lordship's *Proposition*, the *Difference* between us will still be the *same*; his Lordship having even in his *last Performance* acknowledged the *Doctrine* in as full a manner as it was ever charged upon him by me in Vertue of his *Proposition*. This I have largely proved in the *Preface* to my *Appeal*; *Silvius* (u) confesses the thing, and thinks that *perhaps* I had done as wisely to keep it to my self. *Whether* (says he) he hath mistaken the Bishop or not, 'tis plain enough that he differs from him; and I fear will do while his Lordship continues to publish some sort of *Doctrines*. Here then I rest, whether wisely, or not wisely, let the Reader judge. But if *Silvius* considers, who 'tis that hath so solemnly acquainted the World, that (w) I could not suffer my self to differ one Hair's breadth from him, he may, *perhaps*, find Reason to think that he had done as wisely, if he had kept this to himself, unless he thinks that he *pleasures* the Bishop, by affording him every Day fresh *Occasions* to exercise his *Compassion*.

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(u) P. 38. (w) *Common Rights*, &c. p. 117.

But tho' I think it not to the Purpose to enter upon a new Examination of the Bishop's *Proposition*, yet one thing there is which ought to be taken notice of. 'Tis a Thought perfectly *new*, which *Silvius* is extremely fond of; which he expects will *startle* me; and which he *cannot imagine how I will fence against*. I had said, and insisted upon it with some Vehemency, that to say, that *the Favour of God equally follows every equal Degree of Sincerity*, CAN imply no less, than that *the Degrees of Favour will be equal, where the Degrees of Sincerity are equal*. *Silvius* has a mind to (x) see what Grounds I have to be so Positive and Resolute in this Matter, and very gravely sends me to Dr. *Waterland's Vindication*, to find out my Mistake. I have so high an Opinion of the Abilities of that Learned Man, that I am always apt to suspect any Cause against which he is engaged. I was therefore in some Pain for my self till I look'd to the place, where I found my self agreeably surprized with the following Observation, *viz.* That the Word *equally* has two Senses, and signifies either *as much as*, or *as well as*. Is this *all Sir!* Alas! You needed not to have sent me to a *Master of Language* for this. Thus much I knew very well before. But I do not yet know, and he must be a *Master* of some *new Language*, that will tell me, that it is in any one's Liberty to *chuse* which of these two Senses he pleases in this place, when the following words do so manifestly *confine* us to one of them. The Bishop doth not say, the Favour of God *equally*

follows EVERY SINCERE MAN, but that it *equally* follows EVERY EQUAL DEGREE OF SINCERITY; which are different things. In the one Case the Word *Equally* may be interpreted, according to the latter Sense, and the Bishop might have been supposed to have meant, that *one Sincere Man* is in God's Favour, *as well as* another. But in the other Case there is a *Necessity* upon us to interpret it according to the *former* Sense, and the whole Passage can imply no less, than that the Favour of God follows every equal Degree of Sincerity in an equal MEASURE, or PROPORTION. If you will not yet believe me, put *as well* in the room of *Equally*, and see how the Sentence will run. *The Favour of God follows Sincerity, considered as such, and consequently, AS WELL follows every equal Degree of Sincerity.* Is not this pure Sense? It might have been said consistently, *The Favour of God as well follows one Degree of Sincerity as another.* But when it is said, that it *equally* follows equal Degrees, the Word *equally* † can admit of no other Sense than that which I have given it. But *Silvius*, I perceive, has an Aversion to my way of (y) *dress*ing, and therefore let him take it in his own. (z) *Of two Christians Sincere IN THE SAME DEGREE, one is blessed with the Favour of God, AS WELL AS the other.*—Away with you for a *Disabler of Criticisms*. Do you not see that the Sentence is *redundant*! Is there not as

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† In *Euclid* I read thus; *In circulo aequales rectae lineae aequidistant a Centro.* When my Friend will learn how to construe this; he will, probably, at the same time be able to find out the true Sense of the Bishop's Proposition.

(y) p. 32. (z) p. 35.

much Truth in saying, that of two Christians *Sincere* (whether in the *same Degree*, or not in the *same Degree*) one is blessed with the Favour of God as well as the other? What then have the *Degrees of Sincerity* to do here? Was it, could it be the Bishop's Meaning, to say, that one *Sincere* Christian is in the Favour of God as well as another, if they be all of them *Sincere in the same Degree*? What Pity is it that this Gentleman cannot be prevailed upon to let this Passage alone! 'Tis bad enough as it is, but he is resolved by his *Tinkering* to make it worse. To save his Lordship from a *Slip* in Point of Truth, he cares not if he makes him talk *Nonsense*.

The Reader may take this upon my Word, as an exact *sample* of the rest; or if he has the Curiosity, or thinks the Point of that weight, as that he ought, to make himself *his own* Judge, he may, with a moderate Degree of Attention, do it without any help from me, who am in no manner of Pain about the Determination. There is one Remark more in *Silvius's* Book, which I must just take notice of. The Bishop has been pleased to tell me once, and again, that my Doctrine, which allows a good Reward to all *Sincere* Men, is as much liable to certain *Objections* of the Dean of Chichester, as *his*, and particularly that it equally *Sanctifies the Cruelties of an Inquisition*. To which *Silvius* now adds, that it equally *justifies all the Forms of Error and Impiety, which ever a deluded People, &c.* My answer was this; That by *Sanctifying the Cruelties of an Inquisition*, the Dean meant that the *Cruelties of an Inquisition* are the *Holiness of a Christian, or Gospel Holiness, &c.* That therefore this Objection lay full against the Bishop's Doctrine, which supposes *Sincerity* to be the whole of *Gospel Holiness*,  
but

but not at all against *mine*, which supposes the contrary. To this *Silvius* has found nothing better, than to say,——'Tis all unanswerable, and I desire to be excused from meddling with it. He spoke this in jest, I suppose, but he might as well have said it in good earnest; for the thing is *truth*, and it will be a vain thing to go about to disprove it. He adds, *By the same Rule I suppose, the word JUSTIFYING, in the latter Clause, does not signify a DELIVERANCE from GUILT and CONDEMNATION, as (saith he) Divines used to tell us, but——SOMETHING ELSE, that Mr. Stebbing will acquaint us with another time.* You are certainly in the Right, Sir, tho' I perceive you know it not. *Justification* doth not signify merely a *Deliverance from Guilt and Condemnation*; and if you would know what that *Something* is, which it signifies *besides*, it is, the being accounted, or the being in *such a State*, as to be accounted, or accepted as *RIGHTEOUS before God*; which none are, or can be, who have not fulfilled the *Law of Righteousness*, which is now the *Gospel Law*, and that only. Thus the Scripture useth this Word, and thus good *Divines* always use it. If *Silvius* knows of any that have used it in *his Sense*, they are such *Divines* as——I need not say who.

And here I end, with letting *Silvius* know that he is not the Man that I at first took him to be. He set out with the Air of a *Sober Writer*, which (much more than the Weight of his Arguments) was the Reason why I took notice of him. And he has given abundance of good *Advice* to the *Dean of Chichester*, to instruct him how to Write *Controversy*. This gave me a Sight of some Properties in the Man, which I thought not very commendable; yet I thought my self in  
Charity

Charity bound to hope that it was all well intended ; and I almost promised my self, that *he* at least would be mindful of *his own Rules*, and *not Rail*, if *he could not Reason*. But he has too soon convinced the World, that it is a much more easy thing to *advise* well, than to *do* well ; and that this wonderful *Calm* was owing only to this, that nothing had yet happened which had the least tendency to disturb him. 'Tis *no News* now that *Silvius* can be angry, as well as commit *Mistakes*, and overlook *Distinctions* ; yea, that he can be angry, only because *he is told* of his *Mistakes*. This is all the *Incivility* he could charge me with ; and for this he has thought fit to set me forth as a Writer of finished *Effrontery* ; quarrels at every thing I say, tho' at the same time, as it should seem by his *Uneasiness*, he likes hardly any thing that he says himself. *Silvius* has given us some Reason to expect, that we may in time hear farther from him. If we shou'd, I will promise him thus much before-hand: that if he offers any thing which I judge to be of Weight, as to the main Point, I shall take care to reply to it, whenever a convenient Opportunity offers its self. This is a piece of Justice due to all Writers ; but if he expects that I should pay the same Regard to his future Performances (unless they should prove of another sort) that I have paid to this, he will find himself to be mistaken. He perhaps may find more Time to spend in Cavilling ; but I do assure him I have none left to bestow in attending him.



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## APPENDIX.

*Containing some Observations upon a Passage in Mr. Sykes's Answer to the Bishop of Oxford, relating to Sincerity.*



R. Sykes having appeared a very zealous Advocate for the Doctrine of *Sincerity*, as lately taught by the Bishop of *Bangor*; I cannot forbear laying hold of this Opportunity, of making a brief Remark upon a Passage relating to this Subject, which I find in his *Answer to the Bishop of Oxford*. His Lordship had observed that some of the Bishop's \* *best Friends*, who had taken great

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\* *Defence of the Charge*, p. 29.

## A P P E N D I X.

*Pains to defend him, and could not want Means to know his true Sentiments, had extended this Doctrine to UNBELIEVERS, as well as others, in such a Sense as to put them all upon the same Foot, with respect to the Rewards of a Life to come, merely in Vertue of their Sincerity; or so as not to allow any Advantage to the one above the other, upon the account of the different Methods of Religion, which they embraced. And for this his Lordship was pleased to do me the Honour to refer his Reader to the Preface to my Appeal, where I had produced several of the Bishop's Friends, and amongst the rest Mr. Sykes, who had asserted that a Sincere UNBELIEVER, if he be in OTHER RESPECTS equal to a BELIEVER, will be in as good a Condition as the BELIEVER. To this Mr. Sykes answers; "The Favour of God has been extended by my self, and others to Unbelievers.—*  
*"But then cannot the Favour of God be equally extended to all Unbelievers, who are equally Sincere, without placing all such Unbelievers in the Joys of that PECULIAR KINGDOM, which Christ has procured for his faithful Subjects, who are, and must be BELIEVERS? Or why must the Comparison be run betwixt Believers and Unbelievers, because the Sincerity of each is the same? Unbelievers that are Sincere, may be in the Favour of God, tho' not admitted to the Joys of Sincere Christians; because the Belief in Jesus Christ, is a Capacity which Infidels have not for a PECULIAR DEGREE of Happiness, and the Rewards of God will equally follow equal Sincerity, only where every Capacity is equal. When therefore your Lordship says, that should any Prince openly profess, that Rewards should equally follow every equal Degree of Merit, you must presuppose equal Capacities*  
*" in*

## A P P E N D I X.

“ in the *Subject*, and the Prince able to reward  
 “ equal *Merit* in the same Degree equally. If  
 “ therefore *Heathens* had equal *Capacities*, and  
 “ equal *Merit*, they would have [their *Reward*]  
 “ in the same Degree. But no Man ever said, that  
 “ they had equal *Capacities*, and equal *Merit*, Sin-  
 “ cerity alone not being both these. To the  
 “ *Belief* of *Christ* a PECULIAR *Reward* is promised,  
 “ which is not promised to them that do not be-  
 “ lieve. Suppose now *Sincerity* in a *Christian*,  
 “ and in an *Unbeliever* exactly the same; yet the  
 “ PECULIAR PROMISE of *Reward* made to *Belief*,  
 “ sets the *Believer* in a Station PECULIAR to HIM-  
 “ SELF. †

I recite this Passage at large, not because I  
 purpose to give it a thorough Examination; but  
 that I might not leave room for any Reader to  
 suspect, that by suppressing any part of it, I had  
 given a wrong turn to the Sense of the whole.  
 That which I would observe, is only this, that  
 there is a very plain Acknowledgment, that there  
 is a peculiar Kingdom, or a peculiar Reward pro-  
 mised to *Believers*, which is not promised to *Un-*  
*believers*, and to which therefore *Unbelievers*  
 have no Right. The Question therefore, so far  
 as *Unbelievers* are concerned in it, is entirely gi-  
 ven up, and Mr. Sykes must retract his former  
 Assertion, viz. That a Sincere UNBELIEVER, if he  
 be in other RESPECTS equal to a BELIEVER, will be  
 in as good a Condition as the BELIEVER; for he  
 himself now says, that the PECULIAR PROMISE of  
*Reward* made to BELIEF, sets the BELIEVER in a  
 Station PECULIAR to HIMSELF. It was absurd, and

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† *Vindication of the Innocency of Error*, p. 35, 36.

## A P P E N D I X.

Ridiculous in Mr. Sykes, to endeavour to save himself from this Contradiction, by alledging, that the Question *presupposes equal Capacities in the Subject*, and that *no Man ever said, that HEATHENS and CHRISTIANS had EQUAL CAPACITIES*. For, 1. The Question is, *What are CAPACITIES qualifying Men for greater Rewards*, and therefore it can *presuppose* no such thing. To ask whether a Sincere Unbeliever is not capable of, or may not qualify himself for as good a Reward as a Sincere Christian, is Sense. But it is Nonsense to enquire, whether *supposing the Capacities, or Qualifications in both to be equal*, a Sincere Unbeliever is not capable of, or may not qualify himself for as great a Reward, &c. Again, 2. He who affirms, that a Sincere Unbeliever, if he be in other Respects equal to a Believer, will be in as good a Condition as the Believer, does thereby directly exclude FAITH from being of the number of those Capacities, or Qualifications, which will entitle a Man to a greater Reward, and confines them wholly to those other Respects, which, as I have elsewhere observed, and as is very evident, are according to Mr. Sykes, their Moral Improvements. But now Mr. Sykes expressly declares, that the Belief in Jesus Christ is a Capacity, which because Infidels have not, they may therefore not be admitted to the Joys of Sincere Christians; which (even according to his own Way of Reasoning) is the same thing, as to say, that they may not be admitted to the same Degrees of Reward with Sincere Christians.

It is a vain thing therefore for Mr. Sykes to endeavour to reconcile these Concessions with his former Assertion. But I am glad to find that Reason can at last be heard upon any Terms; and since this Gentleman is got thus far, I must desire

## APPENDIX.

desire him to try if he cannot go a little farther. He is brought at last, you see to found Men's Title to the Gospel Rewards, where I have founded it, and where it ought to be founded, viz. upon Gospel-Promise. For he therefore supposes that Sincere Unbelievers may not be partakers of these Rewards, because they are not promised to them. Let him now consider upon what Conditions the Gospel promises Salvation, even to Believers, and see if he can find any greater Provision made to such among them (if such indeed may be called Believers) as do not hold that Faith which the Gospel declares, or do not practice those Duties which it commands, than is made for Unbelievers. If he cannot (and I am verily persuaded he cannot) he will then be obliged in Vertue of his own Reasoning, to exclude these from any Title to those Rewards, as well as the other.—But these perhaps he will say \* are trifling Researches; and he may say so, if he pleases. But for my own part, I hope I shall always have more just and decent Apprehensions of that Gospel, which was promulged for the Salvation of Men, than to esteem it a trifling thing, to enquire upon what Terms that Salvation is promised. And why Mr. Sykes, setting this Enquiry aside, should point it out to us as the real Controversy, which he should rejoyce to see clearly stated, viz. How far bare Error, the Result of Search and Industry, will throw a Man QUITE out of the Favour of God, and make him obnoxious to his WRATH; for this, I say, I am able to give no other account, than that he himself hath written a great deal upon

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\* Ibid. p. 36, 37.

## A P P E N D I X.

this latter Question, and finds nothing to say upon the former. The *one* is a Point in which he will meet with no Adversaries; and the *other* will find him more work than he can tell how to go through with. This may probably be the Reason which determined Mr. Sykes in his Choice of the *real Controversy*; and I cannot but own, that when a Man is forced to part with any thing against his Will, there is some *Policy* in endeavouring to flatter himself into an Opinion, that it signifies nothing.

## F I N I S.

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**A**N Appeal to the Word of God for the Terms of Christian Salvation: Or a Discourse, Proving that SINCERITY, exclusive of the Method of Religion which a Man follows, is not sufficient to entitle him to the Kingdom of Heaven. With a Preface, in which is contained a Reply to such of the Lord Bishop of *Bangor's* Answer to the Reverend the Dean of *Worcester's* Sermon, and of his Postscript in answer to the Lord Bishop of *Oxford*, as relates to this Subject. By HENRY STEBBING, M. A. Rector of *Rickingham* in *Suffolk*, and late Fellow of *St. Catharine's-Hall* in *Cambridge*.

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